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Abstract
This editorial provides an introduction to the thematic issue “Politicization of EU Trade Policy Across Time and Space.” The
academic editors place the issue in the context of the current literature, introduce the contributions, and discuss how the
articles, individually and jointly, add to the state of the art.
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Since the global financial crisis, political populism has
risen throughout Europe and North America, and the
global trade governance regime is regularly maligned by
the Trump administration. As a standard bearer for mul-
tilateralism, the European Union (EU) is now focusing
primarily on bilateral trade negotiations, arguing that
a widening net of agreements elevate bilateral achieve-
ments to themultilateral level. During this time, its trade
policy has also become increasingly politicized. This be-
came particularly evident during the EU’s negotiations
with the United States (US) on the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and in the later stages
of the negotiations with Canada on the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The issues raised
and proposals made during these negotiations became
highly salient for a large number of actors, with opin-
ions increasingly polarized. Scholars studying the nego-
tiations directed their attention toward the outside lob-
bying activities of civil society organizations’ (CSOs), the
emphasis on regulation in new-generation trade agree-
ments, and Europeans’ perceptions of the US (Laursen &
Roederer-Rynning, 2017).
The contributors to this thematic issue unpack the
concept of politicization in its different forms and man-
ifestations. They explore variation in politicization across
different EU trade negotiations, trace the evolution of
politicization over time, and gauge the reasons for vary-
ing degrees and manifestations of trade politicization
across EUMember States. Rather than treating politiciza-
tion as a singular resultant of a particular negotiation, or
as a fixed cause for change in negotiating behaviour, we
conceive of politicization as a process, in which different
negotiations interact, that evolves over time, and that
takes a different form at different levels across Member
States. Politicization is not only the result of action—the
outcome—but can also be the context inwhich actors en-
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gage and take decisions. In particular, the contributions
look into, and compare, the politicization of EU trade
negotiations within advanced industrialized countries as
well as within Latin-American, African, and Caribbean
trading partners. They examine when and how we can
expect politicization, analyse the framing of communica-
tion used by the European Commission and CSOs, exam-
ine the politicization of specific issues, and assess varia-
tion in politicization across Member States through care-
fully selected case studies.
In their contribution, De Bièvre and Poletti (2020)
look at differentiated trade politicization across EU bi-
lateral trade negotiations. They argue that in order to
understand why there was politicization over TTIP (and
CETA), onemustweigh the relative explanatory force one
can accord to parliamentary control over trade policy,
the depth and comprehensiveness of the trade agree-
ment, and the relative economic size of the trading part-
ner. Since these explanations fail to account for the
lack of politicization over parallel or similar EU negoti-
ations, they argue that they can more usefully be con-
sidered structural background conditions upon which to
build explanations grounded in agency enacted by in-
terest groups. They therefore sketch several avenues,
flowing from interest group and public opinion research,
for investigating interest groups’ identification of latent
issues that can be made salient by tapping into, and
then mobilizing, public opinion through framing and out-
side lobbying.
Andrea Bianculli’s (2020) article looks at politi-
cization in negotiating partners’ countries during the
EU–MERCOSUR negotiations. She shows that internal
politicization in MERCOSUR countries was not accompa-
nied by contestation or an undermining of negotiating
authority. On the contrary, she argues that internal politi-
cization, in conjunction with external pressures and de-
mands by trading partners, especially the EU, to negoti-
ate with the entireMERCOSUR bloc rather than with sep-
arate countries led to constant, unwavering support for
the negotiations.
AnkeMoerland and Clara Weinhardt (2020) also ana-
lyse politicization in EU partners, comparing politiciza-
tion in the Caribbean and Western Africa. They find that,
in contrast to the state of the art on the politicization
of EU external relations, deep integration measures do
not automatically fuel politicization in partner countries.
Whereas their inclusion in the EU–Caribbean deal did
not lead to politicization, the absence of deep regulatory
commitments in the EU–West Africa deal did not fore-
stall significant internal contestation. They conclude that
trade politicization is not automatically triggered when a
country is negotiating a deep trade agreement, norwhen
CSOs have resources. Yet, politicization is less possible
and less probable when CSOs lack resources.
Two contributions probe deeper into the types of dis-
courses both civil society and public actors engage in
when politicizing EU trade negotiations, and when they
react to such societal mobilisation. Gabriel Siles-Brügge
and Michael Strange (2020) look at CSOs’ activism and
framing during trade negotiations. They show that there
is a consistency between how CSOs discussed and ad-
dressed issues in TTIP and what they had done during
the campaign against the General Agreement on Trade
on Services, during the Doha round negotiations. In both
cases, CSOs wanted to construct a transnational network
of activists, and, accordingly, built a transnational frame
for a transnational campaign. The need for transnational
solidarity meant that their collective action frames did
not rest on establishing a polarizing fault-line between
political activity at the domestic (local and national) and
supranational levels.
Patricia Garcia-Duran, Leif Johan Eliasson, and Oriol
Costa (2020) examine political leaders’ responses to
politicization over TTIP (and CETA) and its aftermath by
examining the rhetorical response from the European
Commission, while also presenting some of the ways pol-
icy changed as a result of politicization. Using a quali-
tative analysis of the European Commission’s speeches,
they show that the Commission responded to politiciza-
tion by using a rhetorical counter-strategy, grounded in
a pre-existing doctrine of so-called ‘managed globaliza-
tion,’ initially coined at the turn of the century. Whereas
initially elements of the managed globalization doctrine
were used to lessen polarization, but without touting the
doctrine, the Commission’s communication from 2016
onwardwas explicitly framed using the language of ‘man-
aged globalization.’
The next set of four contributions dig deeper into
variation in politicization across EUMember States. Niels
Gheyle (2020) presents a comparison of domestic coali-
tions that emerged in Germany, Ireland, and Belgium,
during TTIP negotiations, and argues that there is differ-
entiated politicization across settings because of differ-
ences in CSOs’ mobilization of resources. He then iden-
tifies the elements that contribute to such resources, in-
cluding themobilization of experts, the availability of pre-
viously existing domestic alliances, and an inclusive fram-
ing approach used to establish a diverse coalition.
Sophie Meunier and Christilla Roederer-Rynning
(2020) tackle the riddle of why France was largely ‘miss-
ing in action’ during the anti-TTIP campaign. They show
that despite a large and strong network of CSOs, under-
pinned by anti-American sentiments and strong politi-
cization in neighbouring countries, French public opinion
could not be mobilized against TTIP and CETA. They chal-
lenge the explanatory power of resourcemobilisation, ar-
guing that the relatively subdued politicization and resis-
tance to TTIP in France was not due to lack of CSO ac-
tivism, but rather the success of depoliticization efforts
undertaken by the French government.
In her contribution, Aukje van Loon (2020) makes
a case for taking domestic level variables seriously.
She argues that by examining domestic material inter-
ests (business associations and trade unions), societal
ideas (voters and non-governmental organizations) dom-
inant in these countries’ domestic politics, as well as
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their interaction with national institutions, one can bet-
ter understand the United Kingdom (UK) and German
governments’ positions during TTIP negotiations. She
shows that the inclusive, consensus-oriented institu-
tions in Germany can account for a gradual decline
in public support for transatlantic trade negotiations
in Germany, whereas majoritarian competition-oriented
decisionmaking in the UK fail to trigger such an outcome,
despite very similar material benefits expected from TTIP.
The last two contributions draw attention to the
relationship between politicization and authority shifts.
Anna Herranz-Surrallés (2020) tackles the question of
how politicization of Investor–State Dispute Settlement
can lead to vertical authority shifts (between interna-
tional and national levels), as well as horizontal authority
shifts (between public and private forms of governance).
She shows how these very different institutional conse-
quences pan out through a comparison of reformswithin
the framework of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law and the Energy Charter Treaty.
María García (2020) looks at the challenging case of
the UK, where a vertical authority shift is taking place.
If Brexit is considered a trade policy issue (given that
the EU is a major trading partner), then the ongoing
Brexit debate is the most important instance of trade
politicization in the UK, more than TTIP, and one that
has ended with re-nationalization. Like Herranz-Surrallés
(2020), she thus underlines that authority shifts also im-
ply a shift in the focus of legitimacy demands, which is
the argument underpinning the idea of ‘taking back con-
trol’ used by Brexit supporters.
The existing literature on European trade policy con-
curs that support for deep and comprehensive trade
agreements with large or similarly sized countries varies
across Member States (Young, 2017) and that some
major drivers of politicization include the depth of
the integration/trade agreement, the degree of CSO
attention and mobilization, and differences in public
receptiveness to actors’ frames (Laursen & Roederer-
Rynning, 2017; Leblond & Viju-Miljusevic, 2019; Young,
2017). The contributions to this thematic issue, in var-
ious ways, assess and qualify these variables’ explana-
tory power. In and of themselves, they do not suffice
(either separately or jointly) to explain differentiated
trade politicization (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020; Moerland
& Weinhardt, 2020). They may have to be combined
with domestic institutional factors (Meunier & Roederer-
Rynning, 2020; van Loon, 2020), transnational politiciza-
tion (Siles-Brügge & Strange, 2020), the interaction be-
tween interest group agency and public opinion aug-
menting the salience of certain issues (De Bièvre &
Poletti, 2020), and the influence of previous politicization
(Bianculli, 2020; García, 2020; Garcia-Duran et al., 2020;
Gheyle, 2020; Herranz-Surrallés, 2020).
Most contributions to this thematic issue also ex-
plicitly or implicitly engage with two prevalent hypothe-
ses in the literature about the politicization of interna-
tional politics and EU integration—i.e., that politicization
is a function of authority transfer, and that politicization
depends on the existence of a network of challengers
with sufficient resource mobilization. In fact, the contri-
butions point out the limits of these hypotheses, and the
ways in which they interact with each other and with
other variables. While none of the contributions chal-
lenge the need for resource mobilization (García, 2020;
Gheyle, 2020), several show that possessing resources
is not a sufficient condition for politicization (Meunier &
Roederer-Rynning, 2020; Moerland & Weinhardt, 2020).
As for politicization being a function of authority trans-
fer, a key contribution is that authority shifts are not
simply a question of more or less authority transferred
to the international level. As part of a dynamic process,
these shifts can be both vertical (among different levels
of public authority) and horizontal (between public and
private forms of authority); they may help re-legitimate
institutions or de-legitimate them, provoke politicization,
but also be the result of politicization (García, 2020;
Herranz-Surrallés, 2020). From this perspective, politi-
cization could be seen as a barometer of the legitimacy
of the prevailing equilibrium between vertical and hori-
zontal authority transfers.
We hope you will thoroughly enjoy the different con-
tributions in this issue. Clearly, trade policymaking by the
EU has become a variegated and dynamic process, look-
ing much like politics itself. Perhaps this is even the un-
derlying theme of the entire thematic issue: the arrival
of normal politics to EU trade policy.
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